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Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Group, 
Inc., United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2654.
Decision Insights, Inc. (DII) developed 
software called a “Dynamic Expected Util-
ity Model” (“EU Model”) which became the 
primary asset of the company.  EU Model is 
an analytical tool used in preparing negotiating 
strategies.  It assesses risk, compares different 
operating positions and trade-offs among the 
alternatives.  Since 1989, DII has used the EU 
Model and owns the assets, copyright, and all 
proprietary rights.
Gary Slack and Dr. 
Bruce Mesquita  de-
veloped the EU Model 
from scratch.  Slack is 
on DII’s board;  Mes-
quita is no longer with 
the company.
In 1998, Carol Alshar-
abati was hired to make 
modifications to the EU 
Model.  She signed a confidenti-
ality agreement.  Curiously, she had absolutely 
no computer training, but admits gaining valu-
able experience while with the company.
Is it that easy?  So why are we not software 
magnates?
Around 2001, Mark Abdollahian and three 
others — Kugler, Efird and Scott — who had 
worked with Alsharabati — left DII to form 
Sentia Group.  All but Kugler had signed 
Trade Secret Nondisclosure Agreements 
(“Agreements”) and Efird’s had a non-com-
pete clause.
Are you following all these players?  It’s 
only semi-important in the case.  Although the 
dynamics of folks jumping ship and going into 
competition holds its business interest.
The original plan was to obtain a software 
license from DII and operate in a separate 
territory.  After all, one of them had signed a 
non-compete agreement.  But Sentia could not 
reach agreement with DII.
Deciding to develop their own version of 
the software, Sentia sought legal counsel and 
were advised that no one who had had access 
to the DII code be involved in the task.  If this 
was not possible, the new code should bear 
no resemblance whatsoever to the EU Model. 
And they had better document every step in the 
development process.
As so many clients do, Sentia ignored 
counsel’s advice and hired Alsharabati to do 
the work.  And she did so in the record time 
of six weeks.
DII claimed the software is identical to the 
EU Model and sued for breach of contract, 
misappropriation of trade secrets and other 
theories not of interest to us here.
Litigation
So far so good.  But then DII got sloppy in 
the discovery process and failed to identify its 
trade secrets with specificity or differentiate 
them from what is public knowledge.  Sen-
tia asked for sanctions, so DII scrambled 
about and identified its entire source 
code (i.e., mathematical equations) as a 
total compilation that was the big trade 
secret and twelve major components 
that were each secrets as well.
Sentia huffed and puffed about that, and 
DII was ordered to produce “all algorithms, 
block flow diagrams, narratives” associated 
with the development of EU Model.  And Sen-
tia was awarded attorney’s fees for its efforts 
in acquiring this information.
DII said the software was over fifteen 
years old and they didn’t have the algorithms. 
Reverse engineering would cost in the range 
of $100,000.  The magistrate judge brought 
them all in again and said if the stuff didn’t 
exist, then it didn’t.  And imposed sanctions 
of $13,256.25.
Ouch.
Sentia moved for summary judgment based 
on the failure of DII to meet the burden of 
establishing trade secrets.  Sentia won this, 
and DII appealed.
The Appeal – Trade Secrets
The state of Virginia defines a “trade secret” 
as “information including but not limited to a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique or process, that:
 1.  Derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being gen-
erally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use, and
 2. Is the subject of efforts that are reason-
able under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy.” Va. Code. § 59.1-336.
The key is secrecy rather than novelty. 
Dionne	 v.	 Southeast	 Foam	Converting	&	
Packaging, Inc., 240 Va. 297, 397 S.E.2d 
110,113 (Va. 1990). “Novelty in the patent 
law sense, is not required for a trade secret.” 
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 
F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993).
Thus the whole secrecy issue is fact-inten-
sive and very much a jury question.  Hoechst 
Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 
411, 419 (4th Cir. 1999).  DII said its soft-
ware is a compilation within which there are 
twelve specific functions, any or all of which 
are protected trade secrets.  Which — see the 
requirements above — is a complex question of 
fact.  The Fourth Circuit agreed and remanded 
to the district court.
Trade Secret Nondisclosure
Abdollahian and others signed agreements 
not to disclose DII’s proprietary information. 
They assigned work product to DII and agreed 
to return all confidential stuff when they left. 
The district court basically ignored this saying 
there was no evidence of breach because there 
was no evidence of any trade secrets.
Since the Fourth Circuit had sent the trade 
secret issue back for a jury trial, then this was 
reversed as well.
Kugler had never executed his nondisclo-
sure agreement but a letter from him to DII 
stated he would never make improper use of 
confidential information.  DII said they would 
never have shared anything with him without 
such an understanding.
The absence of a writing does not mean 
there was no binding agreement.  It is a ques-
tion of intent.  If the parties have a meeting 
of the minds — and part of the understanding 
was that a written contract would be executed 
— then “…there results an obligatory contract 
which neither party is at liberty to repudiate.” 
Manss-Owens Co. v. H.S. Owens Son, 129 
Va. 183, 105 S.E. 543, 547 (Va. 1921) (quot-
ing Boisseau	v.	Fuller, 96 Va. 45, 30 E.E. 457 
(Va. 1898).
Well, those dates seem to make that estab-
lished law.  But the cases do distinguish this from 
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QUESTION:		A	court	library	has	recently	
had discussions with an attorney about the 
copyright	status	of	state	court	briefs.		The	attor-
ney believes that briefs are copyrightable and 
that Lexis, Westlaw infringe when they include 
briefs in their databases without permission. 
The	library	maintains	that	state	court	briefs	are	
public information and not subject to copyright. 
Is there a difference in U.S. government works 
and state government documents?
ANSWER:  Section 105 of the Copyright	
Act says that works produced by the federal 
government are not copyrightable.  Because 
the Act is a federal statute, it is silent as to the 
status of state documents.  Many states claim 
copyright in their documents or at least in some 
of them.  The Copyright Office Compendium 
says that state statutes and court reports are 
not copyrightable.  The question, of course, is 
whether briefs filed in a state court are govern-
ment documents.  
If the brief is for the state as a party to the 
litigation, and the brief is prepared by attorneys 
who are state employees, the brief is likely to 
be a government document, so the answer as 
to whether it is copyrighted or not will depend 
on whether the state claims copyright in its 
documents.  If, however, the brief is one writ-
ten by a private attorney for a private party 
to the litigation, then the brief may well be 
copyrighted.  Some attorneys and law firms do 
claim copyright in their briefs and are particu-
larly unhappy with services such as Lexis and 
Westlaw which sell copies of their briefs.
To my knowledge, there are no 
cases on this issue, and the legal 
authorities seem to say only that 
there may be copyright in briefs. 
Another possibility, of course, is 
that in filing the brief with a court, 
that brief becomes public domain 
as a part of the court record, but 
this does not appear to be a very strong argu-
ment.  Public domain is certainly the best argu-
ment from an open government type argument, 
however.  But consider the following.  A song 
writer has not published a particular song, but it 
is introduced into evidence in a court in a case 
concerning the ownership of the copyright. 
Clearly, introduction of the song into evidence 
in court does not make that song public domain. 
Analogizing to briefs would mean that they do 
not become public domain just because they are 
filed in court.  Unfortunately, this is one area 
where there is no clear answer.
QUESTION:		A teacher in a nonprofit edu-
cational	institution	music	therapy	program	is	
interested in the use of sheet music and print-
ed scores in that program and asks whether 
fair use, the Teach Act or other statutes and 
regulations apply.  What are the guidelines 
for students who routinely download sheet 
music to learn and bring into lessons and 
music	therapy	clinical	sessions?
ANSWER:  If these music therapy sessions 
are for teaching students to be music therapists, 
then the Guidelines on the Educational Use of 
Music apply.  They are available at:  http://
www.unc.edu/~unclng/music-guidelines.htm. 
The guidelines cover both the reproduction 
of music recordings as well as sheet music 
for educational purposes but for study not for 
performance.  General fair use also applies.  For 
performance and display of nondramatic music 
in a face-to-face classroom, the section 110(1) 
exception applies and permits the performance 
if the purpose is for instruction 
and the other conditions are met. 
If the class is a transmitted or 
online class, then the TEACH 
Act permits the performance. 
Neither of these sections apply to 
reproducing sheet music though. 
If the music is to be performed, 
it is a good idea to ask students to make sure 
that they examine the copyright notice on the 
sheet music on the Web and make sure that 
there is no restriction on downloading for 
performance.
QUESTION:		Many libraries are lending 
eBooks on a Kindle.  Is this infringement to 
lend a Kindle loaded with copyrighted books 
acquired from Amazon?
ANSWER:  The Amazon license agree-
ment was last updated in February 2009, see 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/dis-
play.html?nodeId=200144530, and is silent 
about lending Kindles loaded with purchased 
eBooks.  One part of the license states:  “Upon 
your payment of the applicable fees set by 
Amazon, Amazon grants you the non-ex-
clusive right to keep a permanent copy of the 
applicable Digital Content and to view, use, 
and display such Digital Content an unlimited 
number of times, solely on the Device or as 
authorized by Amazon as part of the Service 
and solely for your personal, non-commercial 
use.  Digital Content will be deemed licensed 
to you by Amazon under this Agreement unless 
otherwise expressly provided by Amazon.” 
Library lending is for personal, non-com-
mercial use.
When librarians have contacted Amazon to 
request clarification, the answers received are 
not clear.  As the library lending of Kindles 
becomes more prevalent, it is likely that the 
license agreement will be redrafted to deal with 
this type of use.  Online license agreements 
that are clearly written and easily located on a 
Website tend to be upheld by courts.  Further, 
a library would be considered to have more 
knowledge than an individual user might, so the 
license agreement is more likely to be upheld.
A recent Library Journal (http://www.
libraryjournal.com/article/CA6649814.html) 
article pointed out the mixed messages that 
Amazon has provided on this matter.  At this 
point, however, with the online license not 
mentioning lending of the devices, there ap-
pears to be no reason that a library could not 
lend Kindles to users. 
QUESTION:		Can	a	touchscreen	smart-
board be used for story time in a public 
library?
ANSWER:  As phrased, this is a technolo-
gy question and not a copyright one.  Use of the 
technology itself presents no problems on the 
copyright front.  However, if one reproduces 
works to be displayed on the smartboard, then 
the same issues are present as with photocopy-
ing or with displaying images.  If the question 
contemplates displaying all of the words of the 
story on the screen to help with reading and/or 
including the illustrations, this is reproducing 
an entire work and probably is infringement. 
If permission is sought from the publisher, it is 
likely that permission would be granted.  
a situation where no one intended to be bound 
until a formal execution of a written contract. 
At any rate, we certainly have a nice question of 
fact as to what their minds met upon.
Non-competition Clause
Efird entered into an agreement to not 
compete with DII’s “precise” business for a 
period of two years.  Virginia law examines 
these contracts on a basis of (1) limiting the 
scope to what is reasonably necessary to protect 
legitimate business interests of the employer, 
and (2) not unduly oppressing the employee in 
his efforts to earn a living.  Blue Ridge Anes-
thesia & Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 
369; 389 S.E.2d 467, 470 (Va. 1990).
These covenants are not favored as they are 
restraints on trade and are strictly construed 
against the employer including putting the 
burden of proof of reasonableness on him. 
See Grant	v.	Carotek, 737 F.2d 410, 411-412 
(4th Cir. 1984).
The district court found the agreement was 
“broader than necessary” to protect DII’s le-
gitimate interests.  But this was premised upon 
the belief that DII had no trade secrets.  “The 
possession of trade secrets and confidential 
information is an important consideration in 
testing the reasonableness of a restriction on 
competition.”  Meissel	v.	Finley, 198 Va. 577, 
95 W.E.2d 186, 191 (Va. Ct. App. 1956).
And the sanctions got vacated as the par-
ties had a genuine dispute as to how to iden-
tify trade secrets, and the district court was 
muddled on the issue.  
